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No. 3.] until the appearance of man. In absence of rational intelligence, it was impossible that such a compromise should be contemplated, or even understood. Appetite, passion, force, are the commanding features in animal life; the fight for superiority is incessant because inevitable; and out of this has come everything so clearly recognized under the general law providing for survival of the fittest. The consequence for the present argument is obvious; of these two hypotheses, evolution of species, and "animal ethics," we must surrender one. Under this alternative, "animal ethics" disappears as a stepping-stone towards evolution of man. From whatever source we have obtained our conception of justice, it has not come up to us from the animals which know nothing of compromise. Ethical conceptions must find their explanation otherwise.

A large part of Herbert Spencer's argument passes quite beyond this; and some reference to its additional features is desirable before closing. We have to consider the "antipathy or sympathy" awakened when we contemplate the actions of animals. This will illustrate how we are affected by benefits conferred or injuries inflicted by one animal upon another. These sensibilities of ours at least throw some light on our own moral nature. Among birds, the feeding of a mate during the nesting season; among animals generally, care for their young; and in many cases, the storing for winter awaken our admiration. And this admiration is not restrained because we attribute the actions to instinct, not to intelligent design and sense of duty. On the other hand, our antipathy is roused by actions quite natural to animals, as in the hawk's attack on a linnet, or in the driving off of a competitor, whether food supply is abundant or scanty. Such forms of feeling in us disclose a great deal as to our better nature; but they carry no testimony in support of animal ethics. They demonstrate that the rational nature is the subject of feeling in which animals have no share. The feelings of admiration and of antipathy are quite natural to us, but we should labor in vain did we attempt to awaken in animals the sentiments we so readily experience. Our difficulty in determining what "instinct" is,