Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/264

248 which a higher life has returned upon the lower, presenting a new departure in natural history.

We have now seen in what sense it can be taken as strictly accurate to say with Spencer that there is "a conduct proper to each species of animal." In what sense do we further speak of this as "relatively good conduct"? That one animal should have insufficient food, and so grow feeble, is not good; that another and stronger should find a more liberal allowance is good, as strength is better than weakness; that by these contrasts there should be gain in development of the species, is good for the species as a whole. But the weaker animal knows only its painful experience; the stronger knows only its own comfort; neither knows anything as to the general good. That animals have always acted as described, we are agreed; that the result has been the advance of the species, is also matter of practical agreement among us now. But no one suggests that the weaker animals always yield, and the stronger always persist in the struggle, with a regard to the common good of the species. No one supposes that the relation of the struggle for existence to survival of the fittest, which has been recognized by us only in the present century, has all the while been well known to the animals, so that if they had only had the use of language for the space of two hours, they could have told us all this, and have saved Darwin most of his toils and uncertainties. But nothing less than such knowledge would be sufficient, if we were to admit that in the natural history of the higher vertebrates "something which may be regarded as animal ethics is implied." In absence of such knowledge, Herbert Spencer's contention fails for lack of evidence.

Confirmation of this will be found by reference to his definition of justice, which is as clearly inapplicable to animals, as it is certainly applicable to man. Justice asserts that each must be allowed to act; and that each so restrain himself as to allow to others equal freedom to act. Such a compromise has no place in animal life. "The struggle for existence" implies the reverse. The compromise never had any place in natural history