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124 He never gets beyond an a priori postulated as really given. W. seeks to show that it is to the laws of thought that we owe the distinction as to worth between the content and the form of a sensation. Space and time must not be regarded as the given or ready-made a priori, but as the results of the functions of thought.

Still further, Kant has only shown in general that there must be categories, and there still remains the task of discovering the logical motives which have led to the formation of each individual category. Since, now, all presentations are spatial as well as temporal, we shall find the schema of each category by pointing out to what spatial and temporal condition each concept is subordinate. In all cases, we see that the employment of the categories presupposes definite qualities of the objects which constitute the logical criteria of that employment. These will be at the same time the conditions which necessitate our thought to form these concepts. W. finds the conditions of the empirical concept of substance in spatial independence, and temporal constancy in change. He also shows how the speculative notion of substance has arisen in accordance with the laws of thought. He urges, moreover (and finds confirmation in Kant's Refutation of Idealism), that outer experience is immediate. There is no meaning, then, in the distinction between 'phenomenon' and 'thing in itself'; the proper contrast is between phenomenon and reality. If outer experience is, as Kant himself said, immediate, the problem is no longer to determine how the object is again located outside us. We must rather ask how it comes that, in the course of the development of our knowledge, we recognize certain properties of the immediately known object as no longer objectively given, but ascribe them to the subject. And it is also necessary to explain how science, carrying further the distinctions made in ordinary experience, arrives gradually at pure conceptual determinations regarding the object; and finally, what is the logical justification of these determinations.

Above-named article is a reply to the criticism of Davidson (Int. J. E., Vol. I, pp. 256, 257) on Schmidt's Die Ethik der alten Griechen. The sum of Davidson's criticism is given in his statement: "No account of Greek ethics can be satisfactory which does not fully recognize that Greek ethical ideals, theories, and practices were very different in the