Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/110

94 from the point of view of theistic intuitionism. The style is swift, graphic, and transparent, with sentences here and there having the alliterativeness and pregnancy of proverbs. Itself inspiring, the book should in the hands of a good teacher make an almost ideal primer for boys and girls in the higher classes in our schools. And as it contains nothing which would not be acceptable to most parents, perhaps to all except those who are atheists or agnostics, it may come to be very generally used as a school reader. In that event, it is not unlikely that the author will be requested to expand some portions of the work, which now seems a little too much condensed.

The work falls into three divisions: a short opening chapter (pp. 11-15) on Duty as the voice of God, a short closing chapter (pp. 68-71) on the culture of the moral life, and an intermediate chapter (pp. 16-67) on Duties. The author finds in love to God and love to man the two great kinds of duty. It would have been truer to the higher religious consciousness had prayer, praise, thanksgiving, and trust been described rather as privileges and goods than as duties. As regards duties to mankind, which occupy just two-thirds of the entire volume, they are classified as duties in the family, duties to one's self (to the body, to the mind), duties to others, and duties to government. They are discussed with insight and with great practical wisdom. It may, however, be questioned if the author has not gone too far in his zeal against strong drink when (p. 25) he expresses a doubt whether it should be used as a medicine. Nor is it easy to understand how the love of undeserved admiration, covetousness, avarice, and gambling can be described as violations of duties which would lay claim on a person, "even if he were alone upon the earth" (p. 44). Again, the definition of freedom as "obedience to the truth" (p. 47), though intelligible enough, is not brought into connection with that freedom which is afterwards described as freedom of person, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, and freedom of conduct. Lastly, to find the right of property in "what some one has freely done" may be well enough; but as this is an ideal, rather than the actual basis, it needs to be added that the existing rights of property, if "sacred" (p. 54), derive their high warrant from custom, convention, and expediency. Possibly the author would not be ready to make changes on all the points mentioned, though his general position would not forbid him. With or without such slight modifications, his little book is an admirable text-book for schools.

J. G. S.