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Rh the “ ‘the term “scheme or artifice to defraud,” ’ ” which appears in both §1341 and §1343, “ ‘includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.’ ” Skilling, 561 U. S., at 402 (quoting §1346).

Decades later, this Court considered and rejected the broad argument that §1346 is unconstitutionally vague, and in doing so, clarified the meaning of the phrase “the intangible right of honest services.” Id., at 402–405. Noting §1346’s use of “ ‘[t]he definite article “the” ’ ” in the phrase “the intangible right of honest services,” we held that §1346 covers the “core” of pre-McNally honest-services case law and did not apply to “ ‘all intangible rights of honest services whatever they might be thought to be.’ ” 561 U. S., at 404–405 (quoting United States v. Rybicki, 354 F. 3d 124, 137–138 (CA2 2003) (en banc)). And we observed that “[i]n the main, the pre-McNally cases involved fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been deceived.” 561 U. S., at 404. We reasoned that those engaging in such schemes had sufficient reason to know that their conduct was proscribed. Id., at 407, 410, 412.

Skilling’s approach informs our decision in this case. Here, the Second Circuit concluded that “Congress effectively reinstated the Margiotta-theory cases by adopting statutory language that covered the theory.” 13 F. 4th, at 196. But Skilling was careful to avoid giving §1346 an indeterminate breadth that would sweep in any conception of “intangible rights of honest services” recognized by some courts prior to McNally.

This is illustrated by Skilling’s rejection of the Government’s argument that §1346 should be held to reach cases involving “ ‘undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee—i.e., the taking of official action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed financial interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.’ ” 561 U. S., at 409–410.