Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/97



April 27, 1953

I discussed with Foreign Minister Bidault on Saturday April 25 and with Prime Minister Mayer on Sunday April 26, the question of raising in the Security Council the question of the Communist aggression from Viet Nam against Laos. Both indicated a reluctance to take this step, a reluctance born out of fear that this might precipitate a colonial debate.

I expressed the view that the danger of this in the Security Council might not be as great as in the General Assembly and that it would probably be possible to find out in advance what the result would be in the Security Council, recognizing that Soviet Russia would, presumably, interpose a veto.

I pointed out that it was difficult to treat this Indochinese war as an international matter, perhaps to be discussed between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, if the French and the Associated States themselves treated it as a purely civil war matter.

I said I had not come to any definitive conclusion but that I felt the matter should be explored.

Both Mayer and Bidault agreed to such exploration and to further exchange of views through diplomatic channels.

John Foster Dulles

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