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8. In view of their experience and the language difficulties involved, it is considered that the French are better qualified to conduct the training of the indigenous forces than United States personnel would be. However, it is believed that the French might profit by applying some of the methods the United States forces in Korea are using in training Republics of Korea troops and officers. In this connection the Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), and General Juin have agreed to exchange French arid Vietnam officers from Indochina to Korea, and Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) personnel to Indochina. Accordingly, there appears to be no need for further United States participation in the training of the Vietnamese forces unless specifically invited.

9. The formation of effective Vietnamese forces is handicapped by deficient Vietnamese incentive and lack of qualified indigenous military leadership. Consequently the French should be given encouragement to grant Vietnamese forces more military autonomy and to train indigenous officers to assume more responsibility for control of local forces.

10. Although the U.S. Air Force has recently assigned some aircraft maintenance crews, on a temporary basis, to help the French overcome a critical period in their aircraft operations, it is considered that the French have the ability and can provide the personnel which would permit maximum utilization of their aircraft. Current practice provides for Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to obtain the aid of special technical groups from the U.S. Services whenever there is a need to instruct the French in the maintenance and operation of United States supplied equipment. This type of assistance is deemed adequate to meet current maintenance requirements.

11. In studying possible courses of action to be taken in the defense of Indochina, the inadequate port facilities at Haiphong and air facilities in the Hanoi area have been pointed up as major items in restricting the support of military operations. The Chief, MAAG, Indochina, has mentioned that the movement of supplies into the delta could be speeded by two or three months if Haiphong were able to receive and unload deep-draft vessels. The air depot at Bien Hoa is in particular need of expansion in order to accelerate air shipments. The improvement of the port and air facilities would not only provide impetus to military operations, but would benefit the economic status of Vietnam. Such improvement could be made with U.S. monetary and material aid, but in order to avoid possible Chinese reaction, significant numbers of U.S. personnel should not be utilized.

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