Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/267



To estimate the probable reactions of Communist China and the USSR to:

a. The commitment in Indochina, before the end of 1954, of US ground, air, and naval forces on a scale sufficient to defeat decisively the field forces of the Viet Minh.

b. The commitment in Indochina, before the end of 1954, of US ground, air, and naval forces on a scale sufficient to hold the Viet Minh in check until such time as US-developed Vietnamese forces could decisively defeat the field forces of the Viet Minh.

For both a. and b. above:

1. No Chinese Communist intervention in force in Indochina had taken place.

2. Commitment of US forces had been publicly requested by the French and Vietnamese governments.

3. At the time of the US commitment French Union forces still retained essentially their present position in the Tonkin Delta.

4. Communist China and the USSR would have prior knowledge of the US intent to commit its forces in Indochina.

5. Following the US commitment, there would be a phased withdrawal of French forces from Indochina.

6. The US will warn the Chinese Communists that if they openly intervene in the fighting in Indochina, the US will not limit its military action to Indochina.

1. We believe that the Communists would assume that the purpose of committing US forces in Indochina was the decisive defeat of the Viet Minh. Consequently, we believe that Communist reactions to such a US commitment would be substantially the same whether it were designed to defeat the Viet Minh with US forces (Problem a.) or eventually with US-trained Vietnam forces (Problem b.).

In the Event of a Pending US Commitment

2. We do not believe that Communist China, upon learning of a forthcoming commitment by the US, would immediately intervene openly with substantial forces in Indochina. The acceptance by Communist China of an armistice in Korea, its policies to date with respect to Indochina, and its present emphasis on

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