Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/204

 Rh

1. This very important and complex matter is being rushed to such an extent that there remain a number of questions which are not completely answered at this time. However, a successful termination to the Indochina problem is so desirable with respect to all our Far Eastern policies, and the pressure of time so great due to the approaching end of the rainy season there (about October 1 -- after which major operations by the Viet Minh may recommence), that action in principle if felt to be essential by the Secretary of State is warranted at this time. The State Department asserts that if this French government which proposes reinforcing Indochina with our aid, is not supported by us at this time, it may be the last such government prepared to make a real effort to win in Indochina. (This may be somewhat over-pessimistic.)

2. This brief is written without having available the final papers upon which the NSC will be asked to act. These are still (7 September) in process of being drafted by the State Department. However, we are aware generally of their probable content.

3. As you remember, General Bedell Smith presented to the NSC on 6 August the proposals of the DanielLaniel [sic] government to finish up the Indochina situation. This involved a request for about $400 million additional U.S. aid (now $385 million), and Daniel'sLaniel's [sic] statement that his program for Indochina would have to be paralleled by a program to balance the French budget or it would not be politically acceptable to the French Assembly. The NSC (see Tab "A", Action No. 874) agreed at this time that State, FCA and the JCS should proceed promptly with further exploration with the French and that if these agencies felt the French program held promise of success, they should submit detailed recommendations to the NSC. This has now been done and the recommendations will be considered at Wednesday's meeting.

4. At the 6 August NSC meeting, the President commented on the DanielLaniel [sic] proposals, saying he thought we should support the French proposals only under the following conditions (see Tab "B", Brief of NSC Meeting, 6 August.):


 * . We must get the French to commit themselves publicly to a program which will insure the support and cooperation of the native Indochinese. The later increments of our

Rh