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of the importance of Indochina to the free world and our admiration for the efforts and sacrifices of the French and of the Vietnamese and the other Associated States, In turn, the French particularity through M. Letourneau, the Minister for Associated States set forth the strategic concept or plan by means of which it is hoped to break the back of organised enemy resistance.

The French plan, which comprises the elements listed below, is based on the assumptions that there will be no direct Chinese Communist or new massive Viet Minh intervention, and that the Vietnamese forces will be increase by the numbers requested.


 * (1) The raising in 1953, 1954 and 1955 of some 117,000 additional Vietnamese troops to be organized into light Commando-type battalions and security forces officered by Vietnamese and increasingly under Vietnamese military authority; of some 2750 additional Laotian troops similarly organized; of some 3900 additional Cambodian troops similarly organized. In addition, the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force will be augmented to a force in 1955 of 3596 Air Force and 2700 Navy. The total over-all augmentation of Associated States native forces as outlined in the plan is 129,946.


 * (2) The use of these battalions as they become available and in conjunction with French Union and with regular Vietnamese troops to clear the south and center of the country of the enemy. The light Vietnamese battalions would remain in those areas to guarantee territorial security while the regular units (French Union and Vietnamese) would be moved to Tonkin to increase the forces available there for operations against the bulk of the enemy forces.


 * (3) Late in 1954 or early 1955 it is anticipated that the striking force available to the French would be sufficient to permit extensive operations in the North against the Viet Minh. In the opinion of the French High Command, the Viet Minh would be forced to engage in what is hoped to to a decisive action or to be driven into tho barren hill regions where he could not survive as an organised force along present lines.

M. Letourneau furnished information regarding the estimated additional cost of the plan over and above the present costs being borne by the French and Vietnamese treasuries and on the assumption that U.S. assistance, both budget-supporting and MDAP would continue at present levels. M. Letourneau expects that the French and the Vietnamese will be able to finance the additional cost in calendar year 1953 of the new levies provided some 10 billion francs or 123.6 million in U.S. aid expected by the French but not yet provided by us is received. So far as end-items are concerned, arrangements have been made within FY 1953

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