Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/182

 to deal heavy blows to the enemy. In early April 1953, the Viet Minh launched an attack against Laos which although described by the Communist radio as being a "liberation" of that area by Lao Nationalists aided by by "Vietnamese volunteers" was is fact unprovoked and clear aggression by the Viet Minh with practically no Laotian support. The establishment of a strong point at the Plaines des Jarres near Xieng Khouang by the French Union-Lao forces was accomplished and reinforcements were rapidly deployed at Luang Prabang and Vientiane, the two capital cities. The Viet Minh did not attack either capital nor the Plaines de Jarres strong point, but withdraw the main body of invading troops at the end of April leaving some irregular elements behind. Under Communist auspices a "Pathet Lao Government" was established under a Lao leader, but no rallying of the people took place toward this puppet regime and in fact the invasion caused a stiffening of Lao Nationalists in support of the Royal Government. The aged King and Crown Prince had bravely refused to leave Luang Prabang when it was threatened and by example heartened the Lao people against the foreign invaders.

As a result of this new trend in Viet Minh tactics, the Government of Thailand announced its intention to raise in the United Nations a resolution of consideration against the threat to the security of Thailand posed by an invasion of Laos which brought the Viet Miinh to within a short distance of Thai territory.

The United States responded to the emergency and quickly supplied six C-119 aircraft with United States civilian crews to aid in the airlift to the beleaguered garrisons in Laos. This prompt action, together with the immediate arousal of interest by the press of the Free World in covering the blatant attack, may have been one of the causes for the withdrawal of the Viet Minh in Laos.

These developments made it clear that if military progress is to be achieved in Indochina and if the power of the enemy is to be reduced, additional forces and concentration of regular forces will be required. In December of 1952 and February of 1953 French Ministers informed the U.S. Secretary of State that France believed that an additional share of the burden in Indochina would have to be borne by the United States. In reply, the U.S. position, in line with the reference paragraph of N5C 124/2, has been one of willingness to examine sympathetically French requirements while at the same time stressing the need for an over-all strategic plan or concept which would give promise of a substantial reduction of enemy strength within a stated period.

When the French Ministers visited Washington in March of 1953, the President and the Secretary of State reiterated the U.S. appreciation of

Rh