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economical basis or improve the soil to allow more planting and achieve greater output per acre.

(7d) The issuance of a warning to Communist China regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia is contingent upon prior agreement with France and tho United Kingdom to participate in courses of action set forth in other paragraphs of the NSC paper and on agreement with Australia and New Zealand as well that such a warning should be given. Efforts to reach traders landings on the action to be taken if Communist China invades Southeast Asia have made progress at the military level. On October 6, 1952, military representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand met in Washington, D. C., to consider purely military aspects of the defense of Southeast Asia in event or Chinese Communist aggression. It had been considered previously that the possible advantages of a Five Power Military Conference justified its being held despite the fact that firmly agreed upon joint political guidance had not been obtained.

The representatives concluded that:


 * a. Air, ground and naval action limited only to areas of aggression and contiguous areas of China offers little prospect of causing Communist China to its aggression.


 * b. The imposition of a total sea blockade, in conjunction with the actions limited to the areas of aggression and contiguous areas of Communist China would offer little assurance of forcing tho Chinese Communists to cease aggression.


 * c. A combination of all coercive measures including the defense of the areas of aggression, interdiction of the lines of communication, a full sea blockade and air attacks on all suitable targets of military significance in China, in so far as they are within the Allied capabilities, plus such reinforcements in time and scale as may be practicable in the immediate area, offers the best prospect or causing Communist China to cease an aggression.

These conclusions, however, must be considered as purely military view. The British endeavor to limit the course of action to the area of aggression by contending that expanded air and naval action would be ineffective and beyond Allied capabilities. The French were primarily concerned with action related to the defense of Tonkin. The foreign delegates also stressed the necessity for additional direct military support in Tonkin and Hong Kong both before, as a deterrent, and after an aggression. It was obvious that the other powers expected the

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