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6. In accordance with the decisions taken by the United Nations, a political conference is to convene within a maximum period of ninety days after the signing of the truce. It is clear that this conference will consider primarily problems relating directly to Korea, which it is specifically instructed to resolve. Nevertheless, the success of its mission, though greatly to be desired, should not result first of all in a worsening of the conflict in Indo-China.

7. As was found by the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Washington, it may be difficult, for procedural reasons, to place the Indo-Chinese question on the agenda of the political conference. It should surely not be impossible, however, to see to it that Indo-China profits, at least indirectly, from a meeting which is intended to re-establish peace in an area of the Far East, should such an undertaking meet with success.

8. We shall doubtless soon be in a position to sense the attitude of Communist China during the political conference, as the representatives of the United Nations certainly do not intend to allow the meeting to drag on indefinitely without results.

If this attitude, as is possible, is entirely negative, it would obviously be out of the question to expect the conference to have any beneficial effect upon the situation in Indo-China.

If, on the contrary, the climate of the conference becomes more favorable, the opportunity may arise--without jeopardizing in any way a successful solution of the Korean problem--to explain to the Communist representative, unofficially as well as at the conference table itself perhaps, that his conciliatory attitude could not limit itself to regions lying north of the 38th parallel, and that he would be assuming an undeniable risk if he sought to localize his peaceful intentions in such a manner.

Rh