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interrogation of Viet minh prisoners. General Navarre replied that he would cooperate wholeheartedly in this respect and, although unreceptive to a large team of U.S. intelligence personnel in Hanoi, agreed to the stationing of one or two U.S. attaches in Hanoi to increase U.S. intelligence in that area. In view of the implications of U.S. participation in the war in Indochina associated with the employment of a combat intelligence team in Hanoi, I believe that the solution agreed to by General Navarre is best. The existent availability of a hotel room, eating facilities, and an automobile in Hanoi to accommodate U.S. attaches when visiting there, should preclude any major administrative problem associated with the stationing of U.S. attaches in Hanoi.

51. On 12 July 1953 while at USARPAC, the mission received an information copy of a cable (OEF 943670) requesting MAAG Indochina to provide certain data for inclusion in an NSC report, and to develop this data as part of the MAAG work for the mission. Based on information available to the mission and additional data provided by the MAAG, a report (Annex "W") furnishing the required data, was prepared.

52. : It was disappointing that Associated States representatives were not present at all briefings by the French. However, officials of the Associated States appeared satisfied with their participation in the activities of the mission. A lengthy briefing at Vietnamese Army Headquarters in Saigon the third, day of our visit was followed by discussions between myself and the Vietnamese Minister of Defense and

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