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26. The primary deficiencies in the development of indigenous armies lies in the training of leaders, staff officers and, in a lesser degree, specialists (see Annex "K", Training and Schools in Indochina). The "Letourneau Plan" calls for the augmentation of an organization already overwhelmingly preponderant in independent battalions by activating a large number of additional battalions. The "Navarre Plan" will "build up progressively a battle corps by grouping battalions into regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving units thus created the necessary support (artillery, engineers, armor, communications) taking into account the very special character of the war in Indochina". Organization of regular forces along these lines will begin immediately (see Annex "I" Reorganization of French Union Forces), Commando battalions will initially be employed as independent organizations in the pacification program wherein they will get sons battle indoctrination and organized into regiments and divisions at a later date. General Navarre stated that he proposed to keep these battalions on pacification duty 3 or 4 months.

27. Taking into account the current and planned development of Associated States Military Forces, there is no deficit of force in Indochina. The new command in Indochina will, in my opinion, accomplish the decisive defeat of the Viet Minh by 1955. The addition of 2 or more French divisions from outside Indochina would expedite the defeat of the Viet Minh. Greatly increased participation of China in the war in Indochina would require a reappraisal.

Rh