Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/138



stated the opinion that this was not because of any unwillingness of the French to confide in him, but rather because long range operational planning in general has not been done in the past.

14. In my discussion with General Navarre, I emphasized the need for coordination of military aid with operational plans as well as force build-up plans. General Navarre informed me that henceforth General Trapnell would be kept informed of operational plans and be invited to send observers on actual operations. As evidence of French intentions along this line, General Gambiez, Chief of Staff to General Navarre, disclosed French operational plans for the coming months in some detail (see Annex "H"). General Trapnell has been informed.

15. : General Navarre informed me that he has complete authority with respect to the conduct of military operations in Indochina and is unhampered by political considerations. Statements to the same effect were made by his subordinates. However, it is realized that this is on oversimplification of the problem. It gees without saying that declarations made in France, reference the war in Indochina, affect the "will to win" of General Navarre's command, if not the actual conduct of the war. Furthermore, it is believed that certain French military operations in the past, such as the movement of large French forces to Nasan and Luang Prabang, have responded more to political considerations than military requirements. These same political considerations may very probably continue to receive attention in the future.

Rh