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11. : Inasmuch as U.S. military aid has prevented a Viet Minh victory in Indochina, it may be said that this aid has been effectively used. To date, French use differs from U.S. use because the overall war effort has been dominated by purely French military thinking. By U.S. standards some equipment is not used in the most effective manner, such as the use of artillery by single gun or battery in fixed positions, the employment of equipment in static forts, and the dispersion of fire power among a number of small independent units rather than concentration in a powerful striking force. However, General Navarre has informed me orally, and so stated in writing (see paragraph 3 of Annex "E") that he intends the early recovery of a maximum number of units from areas not directly involved in the battle, and the reorganization of these units into regiments and divisions for offensive employment in force.

12. In the past, the military aid programs have filled screened deficiencies for units included in the Phased Force Basis, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No activation of units has been delayed due to nondelivery of MDAP equipment. The aid program has been thoroughly coordinated with so much of military planning as relates to the build-up of force.

13. The Chief, MAAG Indochina has, in general, not received sufficient information on long range operational plans to determine whether the forces we are supporting are required for planned operations. The Chief, MAAG

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