Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/66

 4. Long failed for variety reasons. His personality rubbed people wrong way, he had few contemporaries in Govt (63 is ancient in these latitudes,) he tried to run four jobs himself, he could not conciliate Tonkin, he did not work miracle in applying Mar 8 agreement, he had bad luck in having riot break out on March 19 (for which local officials more responsible than he) causing Viets lose face before America. UNFAIL(daily?) his enemies taxed him with this and with failure to put on big show Griffin mission. Finally, he humiliated Pignon publicly at final five cornered meeting Griffin mission.

5. Fr would probably never admit latter influenced them but it did. Fr have powerful leverage on any govt in controlling rate of transfer of powers under March 8 agreement and execution of supplementary accords. If a Vietnam govt does not get powers rapidly from Fr it comes under cross-fire of own people and Fr, situation Fr can maneuver to nicety. Of course, this cannot be done indefinitely. Exact manner and extent to which it occurred this time may never be known but Bao Dai’s and Long’s accounts sufficiently circumstantial to indicate something like this happened. Nothing so crude as dictum by Pignon or consultation of him by Bao Dai took place. Think Fr would undoubtedly have preferred diem but Bao Dai opposed, face-saving continuance Long over Easter probably also his idea.

6. Fol are implications for US policy:

A. Prospect of US aid indirectly cause for crisis by inducing Viets hyper-confidence and also by furnishing occasion for Viet-Minh demonstration.

B. Any Viets who lose by change and think we are responsible will be bitter and may magnify our role.

C. In view of over-all objectives and aid programs and also because of absence party parliamentary system here as we know it, better for US if national union government set up. Yet if we took any initiative, we would have assume some

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