Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/62

 751G.00/3-2950:SECRET FILE

As said foregoing it appears to Dept that true character FR concessions to IC nationalism under MAR 8 agreements and ultimate intentions in that area are clear to Dept but not RPT not clear to other interested parties. DEPT believes that Indochinese NATL movement, interested Asiatic states and large segment public opinion Western world unsympathetic and apathetic to this great issue because FR have not made these elements sufficiently clear. You will surely understand that DEPT does not RPT not believe that present situation IC calls for further substantive concessions from FR at this tine involving parliamentary action to Bao Dai or two Kings. Obviously Bao Dai and company barely able to discharge responsibilities they are now facing. No part of representations which DEFT suggests you make to FR SHLD be construed as arguing for increase in concessions at this ti,e. This connection, DEPT strongly of view that transfer of Palace to Bao Dai most important single propaganda move possible now; Abbott emphasizes this, suggesting suitable attendant ceremonies. It must be clear to you and through you to FR that DEPT's concern at present is only that FR make its present position and future intentions clear to non-COMMIE neutral world.

DEFT had previously considered asking that you transmit in appropriate form to FR FONOFF note quoted below. Upon reflection in the course of which views Jessup and Buttorworth RECD DEPT believes you SHLD make strong oral representations FR FONOFF using FOL lines as basic guidance in such manner as WLD in your judgment best serve the achievement objectives identified foregoing. Your advice as to manner and timing of such approach awaited by Dept.

QTE The US Govt has expressed its gratification at the ratification by the FR GOVT of tho agreements with the GOVTS of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The real and continuing interest of the US in the strengthening and stabilization of anti-COMMIE NATL regimes in Indochina is well known to the GOVT of France as is the full confidence of the US in tho intentions of the FR GOVT to adopt all measures requisite to providing the three states with the strenthstrength [sic], POLIT and MIL, without which they will be unable to defeat Ho Chi Minh and his foreign COMMIE allies.

QTE The Govts of France and the US have long considered that the recognition of the GOVTS of tho three states by Asian states was a matter of prime importance in order that the anti-COMMIE NATL movements in Indochina be accorded, in the eyes of the world, their true characters as genuine NATL movements and not; as world communism alleges, the creatures of INNER QTE Western imperialism END INNER QTE. The US Govt has, during the past several weeks, approached the several Asian GOVTS most IMMED concern with the state of affairs in Indochina, impressing upon them the desirability of their IMMED recognizing the GOVTS of the

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