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may therefore expect prior notice. We had hoped to be prepared to present more specific US views on the nature and extent of retaliatory action against Communist China following an identifiable aggression in Southeast Asia and other related subjects to the British by this time but have not yet been able to do so. We are finding it difficult to reconcile the proposed diplomatic and military courses of action. Progress is being made and it is hoped that something will be ready in the near future." (Note: Here the Secretary apparently had NSC 124 in mind although he made no direct reference to it.)

The Secretary confirmed to the Ambassador that these were our main points.

The Ambassador referred to the increasing concern in London with Southeast Asia. H.M.G. is concerned not only with the present precarious situation in the area, a concern which has been greatly accentuated in recent weeks by their suspicions of French intentions in Indochina, but also with the snowballing effects of any action which might follow a further Chinese aggression. The question of Korea is of course related to their concern.

The Ambassador then noted that the last Ad Hoc Military Committee's findings were a failure in that they resulted only in the presentation of three parallel sets of views which never met. The time is now fitting, in the opinion of H.M.G., to make a serious effort to reconcile US and UK views. It is therefore requested that we give urgent thought to the following proposal. A politico-military conference be held as soon as possible in which a limited number of British and American military and Foreign Office officials should take part. He spoke of himself, Mr. Matthews, General Bradley and Marshal Elliot. In answer to the Secretary's question ho replied that he did not propose that the Joint Chiefs or any other group be brought from London in order to participate. He believes that the conversations should be concerned with the hypothesis that the Chinese Communists would commit an overt aggression in Indochina, that we were resolved to oppose that aggression and that our objective was to combat the aggression itself and not necessarily to overthrow the Chinese Peoples Republic. On that basis we would concern ourselves with the following two considerations: (a) the kind of retaliatory action which we are able to take and its expected effectiveness, and (b) an assessment of what would be the results of the retaliatory action in bringing the Sino-Soviet pact into operation.

The Ambassador stated that H.M.G. believes that any Chinese aggression could be countered not only whore it takes place but also, to a degree, at the base of the enemy's operations in China without bringing the Sino-Soviet pact into operation. The question to be determined, however, arises out of the difference of opinion between the UK and the US as to where that limit is to be found.

Rh