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13. Military action by the United States against Communist China would inevitably involve the acceptance of increased risks. Such risks, however, should not necessarily be an overriding deterrent to United States action. As NSC 48/5 points out, the risk of global war "should not preclude undertaking calculated risks against specific areas in the over-all interests of the United States."

14. If Communist China commits overt major acts of aggression against French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma and if in the face of such aggression the British and/or French refuse to offer either military or political support to possible United States action against Communist China itself, the effect of United States unilateral action upon our military alliances and positions in Europe as well as in Asia should be appraised and the risk calculated. Further, in such an eventuality, the validity of our alliances might well be re-examined.

15. In the light of all of the foregoing and, to meet the contingencies:


 * . That Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia poses a threat unacceptable at that time to the position of the United States, both in the Far East and world-wide, and


 * . That the United Kingdom and/or France decline to support action against the nation of Communist China,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, strongly recommend the inclusion in any National Security Council policy statement with respect to Southeast Asia stipulation that the United States Government will consider taking military action, unilaterally, if necessary, against the nation of Communist China.

16. Acceptance of the policies proposed in NSC 124 would serve to increase the commitments of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such increase should be accompanied by a substantial upward revision of our economic and military assistance programs for Southeast Asia and for Formosa and by some (possibly substantial) increase in our forces in being. In this connection, current slippages in the military production programs have already reduced planned United States and allied military readiness. There should be no increase in the risk resulting from such shortages in military production. Accordingly, the increases in our assistance programs and cur ready forces, required by acceptance of the proposed policies, would call for a substantial Rh