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of any overt Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia are different in character and in scope from those of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any restrictions which would limit the military action taken in French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma to the area of, or the approaches to, the land battle in opposition to the aggressor forces would result in such military action becoming wholly defensive in character. Such action would, in their opinion, at best be indecisive and would probably extend over an indefinite period.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that military measures taken to prevent the Chinese Communists from gaining control of Southeast Asia by military aggression should, from the outset, be planned so as to offer a reasonable chance of ultimate success. After consideration of the military factors involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in order to offer such chance of success, military operations in defense against Chinese Communist invasion of French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma must be accompanied by military action against the sources of that aggression, namely, Communist China itself. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend, SOLELY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OP MILITARY OPERATIONS, that a strong defense be maintained against such Chinese Communist aggression and that concurrent offensive operations be undertaken against the nation of Communist China. They would point out, however, that this course of action, while offering promise of ultimate success, might result in a long war, and an expensive one at least materiel-wise.

12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, must, in any event, oppose acceptance of all of the military commitments devolving from NSC 124 without a clear understanding that the United States must be accorded freedom of action and, if possible, support in the undertaking of appropriate military action to include action against Communist China itself. Failing such freedom of action, the United States should accept the possibility of loss of at least Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. Such acceptance would call for a United States policy which would limit United States military commitments in Southeast Asia to those necessary to cover and assist possible forced evacuations of the French and/or the British from their positions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their position that United States ground forces should not be committed in French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma and for the defense of those countries. Further, they strongly oppose the United States joining a combined military command for the defense of those countries. TOP SECRET Rh