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any encouragement derived from the warning would probably be offset by fear of involvement in a conflict between the great powers and by general suspicion of Western "imperialist" motives.

7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia the effect would be mixed. There would be a tendency, notably in Japan and the Philippines, to applaud this new manifestation of Western determination to check Communist aggression. On the other hand, the feeling would be widespread, especially in India and Indonesia, that the warning represented another instance of Western meddling in Asian affairs in pursuit of colonial objectives.

8. The effect of a warning on other countries probably would not be of major importance. A warning might well revive the fears in the smaller NATO powers regarding the dangers of general war or of an overextension of Western strength in the Far East, but it is unlikely that the basic attitudes of these countries would be changed.

9. The inclusion in the warning of a threat to use atomic weapons would produce a widespread and serious adverse reaction throughout the non -Communist world.

10. If identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Southeast Asia actually took place, the UN could

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