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military intervention" in Southeast Asia would entail substantial risk of joint military counter action, and that such a risk is unwarranted in view of the prospects for further Communist gains in Southeast Asia without such intervention. They may, however, discount this risk, estimating that there are differences in policy among the five powers and that these powers may not be able or willing to take timely and effective military counteraction.

3. The effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent would depend in large measure on Communist conviction that:


 * . The five powers were not bluffing, and were united among themselves as to the military counteraction to be taken.


 * . The five powers were actually capable of timely and effective military counteraction.


 * . The counteraction would be directed against Communist China itself as well as toward repelling the Chinese Communist intervention.

4. If the Communists were convinced on the foregoing points they would have to recognize that intervention in Southeast Asia would bring military counteraction, the probable

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