Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/216



MR MERCHANT said that the Department of State would re-emphasize to the Defense Department the political and strategic problems faced by Indochina and would make every effort to insure that the question of equipment would receive proper attention at the Pentagon. It was the will of the Department of State, he said, to speed the delivery of military equipment to Indochina, and the urgency of the situation was well understood by Mr. Young and Mr. Bingham, both of whom were most anxious to talk with the General's staff about the specific items needed. MR. MERCHANT inquired whether the General could estimate how long a period would elapse before the first new division of the National army would reach the front, thus permitting French units to be released for European duty. GENERAL de LATTRE answered that three units of Vietnamese troops should reach the Tonkin front next month.

MR. MERCHANT asked whether the General wished to comment on the US economic aid program in Indochina, adding that he should realize that the U.S. felt that it was to the common interest of both countries to give such aid directly to the governments of the three Associated States and to keep local French leaders informed of current economic arrangements. MR. MERCHANT understood, however, that the General felt that economic aid could be used more directly for military purposes. GENERAL de LATTRE replied that when he had first arrived in Indochina in December, 1950, he had felt that the aid program was not working out on a satisfactory basis. According to the General, the problem was caused by the fact that a number of young men with a "missionary zeal" were dispensing economic aid with the result that there was a feeling on the part of some that they were using this aid to extend American Influence. The results

Rh