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Washington were unproductive since it was impossible to discuss the actual situation in Indochina. The French Government in Paris has not yet been stunned into forthright and vigorous action. It is my impression that the U.S. Government has not yet spoken frankly and buntlybluntly [sic] to the French regarding Indochina. Consequently, the staff talks should provide such an opportunity.

The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is weak from the political side. In the drafting stage the Defense representatives argued for a strong, hard-hitting policy on political and economic concessions. The State Department representatives flatly refused and continued to refuse to consider Indochina in that manner. Consequently, the paper ended with a compromise. However, consideration should be given to making any large scale military, political and economical aid program conditional — the French talking vigorous political measures and reforms in Indochina. As it now stands, military aid will be given when its use appears acceptable to U.S. military authorities, from the military point of view. The conditional factor should be introduced with the french on a ministerial level so that the French Government knows of the American position in this matter. With respect to political measures and reforms, the Department of Defense is beyond this jurisdiction. However, we should have sepcificspecific [sic] measures in mind since the State Department representatives reiterated their question "What more can be done in a political way in IndochanIndochina [sic]?"

Finally, we must resolve the problem of influencing the French to take a number of steps in Indochina, on the one hand, without our assuming the responsibility for the success or failure of the overall program to strengthen Indochina's security.

Rh