Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/129



13 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MALONY

I have been reading over the draft statement of US policy on Indochina, in the light of the message which the French Premier sent Defense Minister Moch, who gave it to Secretary Marshall. This message, along with other French expressions, highlights the crux of the Indochina problem — the French are trying too little, too late, and not very hard. They have shown no vigorous leadership nor enlightened capacity. This observation leads to a number of implacable principles regarding U.S. policy on Indochina.

We must avoid, at all costs, the commitment of U.S. armed forces, even in a token or small scale fashion, for combat operations. Such a commitment would lead the French to shake off responsibilities and show even less initiative in Indochina. There are too many undone things to even consider such a commitment at this stage. And, even as a last resort, there would be serious objections to such a commitment from the U.S. point of view. U.S. officials must be on guard against French attempts to pressure or panic us into some sort of a commitment. Failing to get a satisfactory statement from the U.S., the French, over the next few months, may try a little psychological warfare on us. They may speak hopelessly of a coming Dunkirk. They may intimate the necessity to come to an understanding with the Chinese Communists. They may threaten to throw the problem into the United Nations, either in a political or a military way. The best defense against such tactics will be to make the French pull themselves up by their own efforts.

All the current phases of the Indochina problem seem to lead to the conclusion that the proposed military staff talks will provide the most effective leverage for reversing the present defeatist management of the military aspect of Indochina. Our talks with the military representatives in CC: Mr. Dickinson, Jt Secretaries

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