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in Europe, (b) this was the only program that would convince the people of the three Associated States of Indochina of the honesty of French intentions to give then full independence within the French Union, and (c) the French Government would welcome the replacement of French troops by indigenous forces and would aid in every way possible short of assuming an added financial burden which would directly impair its ability to increase its forces in Western Europe. Premier Pleven further stated that it was impossible for the French Government to implement this program due to the lack of funds.

On 22 September, the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense informed the Secretaries of State and Defense of "the need to create immediately powerful national Indochinese armies due to necessity of repatriating as many French forces as possible, since 20 percent of French regular officers and 40 percent of French noncoms were frozen in Indochina." Schuman and Moch stated that there were 72,000 men in local armies but "the desired substantial increase in this number would present budgetary problems which neither France nor the Associated States could presently meet."

Although the French have stated their objective, they have not, as yet, provided the U.S. Government with any firm figures on the size or the costs of the proposed national Armies. The French High Commissioner in Saigon has frequently used the figure of a regular Vietnamese forces of 120,000 men to be organized by July 1951.

Rh