Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/105



751G.5/8–2350 DEPT concurs fully with Paris and Saigon that formation of NATL army; at least in Vietnam and possibly to lesser extent in Laos and Cambodia, is action which approaches closest to these requirements while still remaining within realm of possibility.

We are, nevertheless, conscious of complexity of technical and other problems involved in accomplishing task and aware that it might be matter of years before armies actually exist in usual sense. We, therefore, are seeking means whereby psychological benefits of action may begin to be harvested IMMED even though full realization must, in fact, be delayed. The FOL plan is therefore submitted for your study, comment and discussion with appropriate Fr authorities and possibly Bao Dai.

1) At earliest moment it be solemnly (and simultaneously) declared by FR (Auriol?) and Bao Dai that in keeping with provisions of March 8 Accords, Vietnam NATL Army under command of Emperor will become fact and that all indigenous troops then serving in FR Union forces are incorporated into new NATL Army.

2) That pursuant to ART 3 of Mar 8 Accords it is declared that a state of NATL emergency exists and that His Majesty as Commander in Chief has therefore placed NATL forces under command of FR High Command in the face of threat of FON invasion.

3) That FOL emergency NATL Army will be released from service under FR command to resume fundamental task of assuring internal order, etc., and that in meanwhile officer and NCO training program will proceed.

These are bare outlines which if found feasible may later be enlarged to include invitation to other partisan forces to join colors, provide for Viet staff officers on FR staff, devise program for replacement FR officers by Viets, etc.

In suggesting such, a plan DEPT does not seek to oversimplify problem or overlook drawbacks. It is realized that for the time being this will only be a paper transfer which will be SUBJ to customary Viet criticism of another

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