Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/104



751G.5/8–2350:Top Secret File

AMLEGATION

SAIGON

NO 238

DEPT has viewed growing signs of POUT and MIL deterioration in Indochina with increasing concern. The failure of the Vietnam GOVT and its leaders to inspire support, the slow pace of the Pau CONF and inability or disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership as exemplified by his prolonged stay in FR are among disturbing POLIT factors. Of even greater immediate import are MIL considerations — the increasing indications of CHI COMMIE-Vict Minh military collaboration and ever present threat of CHI invasion.

Whatever prompt action we can take ourselves or recommend to FR to stem unfavorable tide must bear FOL objectives in mind: 1) Have sufficient dramatic impact to stir all factions of Vietnamese POLIT thought, preferably to extent of swaying fence sitters;

2) Serve to repudiate claim that FR are not sincere in implementing MAR 8th Accords and are using "independence within FR Union" as a cloak for colonialism;

3) Have sufficient psychological attraction to nationalists to appease, at least temporarily, their hunger for further evidences of autonomy;

4) Will not in any way jeopardize the already inadequate FR and allied MIL potential in Indochina;

5) Attract other potential non-COMMIE combatant units (Cao Daists, Hoa Hao, Catholics) to side of FR Union troops;

6) Cause no further depletion of West EUR MIL potential and even improve it by releasing FR troops from service in IC.

Rh