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 TOP-SECRET

1.

. U.S. Policy with respect to Indo-China as approved by the President on April 1950 concludes that:


 * (1) Indo-China is a key area or Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.


 * (2) The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indo-China were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast it Asia would then be in grave hazard.


 * (3) Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indo-China.

. On 10 April 1950 the JCS concurred in the above conclusions and recommended early implementation of military aid programs for Indo-China, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Burma. Such aid programs to be closely controlled and be Integrated with political and economic programs.

. On July 1950 the JCS (J.C.S. 1924/14) approved the following in their review of NSC 73.

"If the Chinese Communists provide overt military assistance to Southeast Asian Communist elements, the United States should prevail upon the British to reverse their proffers of recognition to Communist China and to provide such military assistance as is practicable to assist the Burmese and/or the French in resisting Chinese Communist aggression. In addition:


 * ". If overt military assistance is provided the Viet Minh forces of Indo-China, the United States should increase its MDAP assistance to the French and urge the French to continue an active defense, with the United States giving consideration to the provision of air and naval assistance.


 * ". The United States should ask the United Nations to call upon member nations to make forces available to resist the Chinese Communist aggression."

Chinese Communist military moves against Southeast Asia states in the near future are possible and in such an event the U.S. should be prepared to provide military assistance short of actual participation of U.S. Armed Forces at this time. Rh