Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 8.djvu/26

 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive /^ Tr^Aa^) Sir Robert Thompson (whose Malayan experiences had led hijn to Lodge), Sir KODe ^^^^^^^ Bohannon (who began as a Lansdale deputy, ^uf^ho^: :• .si S a. different line), the Marines (with their pacifi- cation "f^orts and CAP's near. Da Eang), the CIA (which produced vxth ?I^tp^s strong svpport, the PAT's-turned RD cadre), USIA and AID (with . SeS LalibSt gfowing field P-^^^^) ' .f ^^Se^ul^^Sh'lnfa^t^y iu+^ hut elicited from Lodge on visits to the U.S. 25th Intantry g?? sion^a^d tSith! ist infantry Division some of his longest and most glowing accounts of pacification in action. 19/) These grou-os and individuals fought about details, sometimes debating minor points like medieval monks but also disagreeing on ffZTl^Tc points - such as whether the object was to gam the ""o^ lit ion's support or to control them by force. (A popular Marine population ssuppor ^^^^_ „^^^ ^^_^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^Slf'aM their hearts aid'minds wi!l follow.") But each group fotmd somethinf that a.uealed to Lodge, .and each in turn gained encouragement from hl^! The slow chaiage in mood also affected Washington. Tn dealing with his role in the re-emphasis of pacification, we m..<;t distinguish between Lodge's influence on our overall, or grand, stratefff- Sn which he was ultimately to have considerable impact -- fhif influence on the operational details of the policy. The latter ^, not Stere t him on a continuing basis, ^d it is thus easy to under- PstiSate his influence. There was, for exaxaple, a tendency in Saigon ^urSg his Ambassadorship to minimize his importance, since each agency ^S igiorrhim when he told them to do something and usually get away + h it But "this pomlar view overlooked Lodge's impact in encourag- "^t.ll' sorts of people to emerge from parts of the USG with renewed i ^. for ^IcJffcafioL It overlooked the impact of his cables a^d state- nts which added up to a massive endorsement of pacification. In his Sis'wiSlles to the President, for example, pacification receives more attention than any other subject. Alone, Lodge could have done little, if anything to move the USG ground But his influence seems clear, more so in retrospect than at Sniiie: at a tiane when frustrations were growing, he was emphasizing a different rhetoric and strategy. The best way to show his emphasis is simply to quote from the .phles ajad memoranda of the period. Each one shows Lodge, either directly or indirectly, putting forth his general beliefs - sometimes ^^"^^^.i^etorv They form an important part of the background to Sfolulif w?e;e pacification was to get its biggest push to that date: Lodge at the end of _hisJlrs t tour in Viet nam, defining ^^^^Iflcation in his paper pro posing hoP Tac; "The first priority after the military have cleared an area is to bring about the selection of an able man for that area, LO TOP SECRET - Sensitive