Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 6. c.djvu/8

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive a few. The MRF has been significantly successful in depriving the enemy of freedom and initiative in the population and resources rich Delta areas. The helicopter has established itself as perhaps the single most important tool in our arsenal -- and we will welcome more. To air support in both RVN and NVN (Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force) goes much of the credit for our accomplishments." 1

The enemy's TET offensive, which began with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon on 31 January 1968, although it had been predicted, took the U.S. command and the U.S. public by surprise, and its strength, length, and intensity prolonged this shock. As the attacks continued, the Secretary of Defense, on 9 February, requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish plans which would provide for emergency reinforcement of COMUSMACV.

After extensive backchannel communication with General Westmoreland, the JCS forwarded these plans on 12 February. The Joint Chiefs assessment of the current Vietnam situation differed markedly from COMUSNACV's year-end assessment submitted only 17 days earlier:

"a. The VC/NVA forces have launched large-scale offensive operations throughout South Vietnam

"b. As of 11 February 1968, Headquarters, MACV, reports that attacks have taken place on 34 provincial towns, 64 district to towns, and all of the autonomous cities.

"c. The enemy has expressed his intention to continue offensive operations and to destroy the Government of Vietnam and its Armed Forces.

"d. The first phase of his offensive has failed in that he does not have adequate control over any population center to install his Revolutionary Committees Which he hoped to form into a coalition with the NLF.

"e. He has lost between 30 and 40 thousand killed and captured, and we have seized over seven thousand weapons.

"f. Reports indicate that he has committed the bulk of his VC main force and local force elements down to platoon level throughout the country, with the exception of six to eight battalions in the general area of Saigon

"g. Thus far, he has committed only 20 to 25 percent of his North Vietnamese forces. These were employed as gap fillers where VC strength was apparently not adequate to carry out his initial thrust on the cities and towns. Since November, he has Rh