Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 6. c.djvu/55

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive The paper, then, concluded that the larger forces of Option I and IA would "greatly reduce risks to Free World forces in SVN and will accomplish U.S. objectives more rapidly than the forces of the other options," and recommended that immediate action be taken to provide the forces of Option I.

Read another way, however, the Joint Staff analysis could be taken to indicate that the United States could successfully pursue a strategy of "population security" by adapting Option III, adding 50,000 troops to the current level in SVN.

At the 2 March meeting of the senior members of the Secretary of Defense's Working Group conducting the reassessment, no consensus was reached on a new U. S. strategy. Apparently, Mr Warnake and Mr. Gaulding were given the task of drafting a new memorandum for the President which would be less controversial than the initial ISA document.

The draft memorandum for the President, dated 3 March 1968, which was prepared by these two individuals, differed markedly in tone from the initial memorandum presented to the Cliffard Group on 2 March. Gone was any discussion of grand strategy. This memorandum recommended simply:

1. Meeting General Westmareland's request by deploying as close to May 1 as practical 20,000 additional troops (approximately 1/2 of which would be combat).

2. Approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate far possible contingencies.

3. Reservation of the decision to deploy the balance of General Westmareland's new request. While we would be in a position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:

a. Cantinuaus reexamination of the desirability of further deployments on a week-by-week basis as the situation develops;

b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contribution in effective military action by the ARVN;

c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of a possible new strategic guidance for the conduct of US military operations in South Vietnam. Rh