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 :c. Plan Three - One and 3/9 Marine Division/Wing Team."

Moreover, these forces were at various levels of readiness and a high percentage of their personnel were Vietnam returnees or close to the end of the obligated active service. The capability of these uncommitted general purpose forces was further constrained, the Joint Chiefs pointed out, by shortages of critical skilled specialists and shortages in mission essential items of equipment and material. Thus, the Joint Chiefs emphasized, our posture of readily available combat forces was seriously strained. Any decision to deploy emergency augmentation forces should be accompanied by the recall of at least an equivalent number, or more prudently, additional Reserve component forces and an extension of terms of service for active duty personnel. Indeed, the Chiefs, warned,

"It is not clear at this time whether the enemy will be able to mount and sustain a second series of major attacks throughout the country. It is equally unclear as to how well the Vietnamese Armed Forces would be able to stand up against such a series of attacks if they were to occur. In the face of these uncertainties, a more precise assessment of USMACV'S additional force requirements, if any, must await further developments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not exclude the possibility that additional developments could make further deployments necessary."

Based on this assessment of the situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded and recommended that:


 * "a. A decision to deploy reinforcements to Vietnfull be deferred at this time.


 * "b. Measures be taken no',r to prepare the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine Division/Wing team for possible deployment to Vietnam.


 * "c. As a matter of prudence, call certain additional Reserve units to active duty now. Deployment of emergency reinforcements to Vietnam should not be made without concomitant callup of Reserves sufficient at least to replace those deployed and provide for the increased sustaining base requirements of all Services. In addition, bring selected Reserve force units to full strength and an increased state of combat readiness.


 * "d. Legislation be sought now to (1) provide authority to call individual Reservists to active duty; (2) extend past 30 June 1968 the existing authority to call Reserve units to active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for active duty personnel.

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