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our control and could compel us to reconsider this position." Although our diplomatic track in Laos appeared hopeful, and our now firm escorted reconnaissance operations provided an image of U.S. resolve to complement the Polish negotiating scheme, we needed to be able to augment this posture in the event negotiations stalemated. If Souvanna were to become discouraged, or if Khann were to view our efforts to obtain a Laotian settlement as a sign of willingness to alter our objectives, we would need additional demonstrations of our firmness to keep these leaders from being demoralized. Since additional military actions in Laos and South Vietnam did not hold much promise, actions or the strong threat of actions against the North might need to be considered. For these reasons, an immediate Congressional resolution was believed required as "a continuing demonstration of U.S. firmness and for complete flexibility in the hands of the Executive in the coming political months.

A crucial interagency meeting was held at the State Department on 15 June to hold final discussions on the recommendation for a resolution to be sent to the President. The meeting was scheduled from the White House and included Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, their principal advisers on the subject, and McGeorge Bundy. On the afternoon of the meeting, a memorandum was distributed by Bundy to the participants, which provided a rather clear picture of current White House attitudes toward the resolution -- and by implication, of the President's judgment on the issue of preparing to take harder measures against North Vietnam.

The memorandum dealt with one subject only -- "actions that would remain open to us in varying combinations in the event that we do not now decide on major military operations against North Vietnam and do not now decide to seek a Congressional resolution." It then listed under the categories of "military" and "political," those actions which were within an acceptable range of U.S. capability, as follows:

"Possible military actions

a. Reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strike, and T-28 operations in all parts of Laos.

b. Small-scale reconnaissance strike operations, after appropriate provocation, in North Vietnam (initially VNAF?).

c. VNAF strike operations in Laotian corridors.

d. Limited air and sea deployments toward Southeast Asia, and still more limited ground troop movements. (Major ground force deployments seem more questionable, without a decision "to go north" in some form.)

Political actions

a. Internationally -- a continued and increased effort to maximize support for our diplomatic track in Rh