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a major policy address during the coming weeks, relying on news conferences and speeches by other officials to state the official view. In contrast to the Rostow approach, his news conference of 23 June and Secretary Rusk's speech at Williams College, 14 June, emphasized the U.S. determination to support its Southeast Asian allies, but avoided any direct challenge to Hanoi and Peking or any hint of intent to increase our military commitment.

In addition, the President asked his advisers the basic question, "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?" On 9 June, the Board of National Estimates, CIA, provided a response, stating:

""With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time -- time in which the total situation might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable to the communist cause.""

The statement went on to argue that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos "would be profoundly damaging to the U.S. position in the Far Bast," because of its impact on U.S. prestige and on the credibility of our other commitments to contain the spread of communism. It did not suggest that such a loss would affect the wider U.S. interest in containing overt military attacks. Our island base, it argued, would probably still enable us to employ enough military power in the area to deter Hanoi and Peking from this kind of aggression. It cautioned, however, that the leadership in Peking (as well as Hanoi) would profit directly by being able to justify its militant policies with demonstrated success and by having raised "its prestige as a leader of World Communism" at the expense of the more moderate USSR.

E. Sources of Moderate Advice

The strength of the Board's warning was weakened by two significant caveats. The first linked the estimate's less-than-alarmist view to a clearly "worst case":

""This memorandum assumes a clear-cut communist victory in these countries, i.e ., a withdrawal of U.S. forces and virtual elimination of U.S. presence in Indochina, either preceded or soon followed by the establishment of communist regimes in Laos and South Vietnam. The results of a fuzzier, piecemeal victory, such as one staged through a 'neutralist' phase, would probably be similar, though somewhat less sharp and severe."" Rh