Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 2. a.djvu/66

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V. The Question of Pressures Against the North

With the policy line and the courses of action for dealing with Laos determined, and with the Laotian military situation having become somewhat stabilized, the Administration turned to the broader issues of its Southeast Asian policy. These were among the principal concerns of the Honolulu Conference, 1-2 June 1964.

A. The Honolulu Conference: Defining the U.S. Commitment.

The Honolulu Conference was approached with the realization that the "gravest decisions are in front of us and other governments about the free world's interest in and commitment to the security of Southeast Asia." The State Department sew such decisions focusing on three "central questions": (1) Is the security of Southeast Asia vital to the United States and the Free World? (2) Are additional steps which carry risks of escalation necessary? (3) Will the additional steps accomplish our goals of stopping intrusions of Hanoi and Peking into South Vietnam? The Conference apparently began with the answer to the first question as a basic assumption. Again State:

"Our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept the overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peiping."

In addition to considering specific proposals for improving conditions in South Vietnam (Administration officials entered the Conference with another assumption that "we must do everything in our power to stiffen and strengthen the situation in South Vietnam" ), the discussions in Honolulu were intended to help clarify issues with respect to exerting pressures against North Vietnam.

B. At Honolulu: Exerting Pressure on NVN

In preparation for the conference, CINCPAC and COMUSIACV had been asked by JCS Chairman Taylor to develop their views on such questions as:

"(1) What military actions might be taken in ascending order of gravity to impress Hanoi with our intention to strike NVN?

(2) What should be the purpose and pattern of the initial air strikes against NVN?

(3)What is your concept of the actions and reactions which may arise from the progressive implementation of CINCPAC 37-64 and 32-64? How may NVN and Communist China respond to our escalating pressures?

(4) If at some point Hanoi agrees to desist from further help to VC & PL, how can we verify fulfillment? How long should we be prepared to maintain our readiness posture while awaiting verification? Rh