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of being able to renew the insurrections in South Vietnam and Laos at a later date. There would nevertheless be a significant danger that they would fight, believing that the U.S. would still not be willing to undertake a major ground war, or that if it was, it could ultimately be defeated by the methods which were successful against the French."

In its discussion of the problem of compelling Hanoi to halt the VC insurgency, the national estimate emphasized that this depended on affecting the will of the DRV leaders. It stressed that the measures called for in the scenario "would not seriously affect communist capabilities to continue that insurrection," stating that "the primary sources of communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous." On the other hand, it predicted that withdrawal of material assistance from North Vietnam would badly hurt the Pathet Lao capability. Because of the crucial importance of Hanoi's will, the estimate argued that the DR "must understand that although the U.S. is not seeking the destruction of the DR regime, the U.S. is fully prepared to bring ascending pressures to bear to persuade Hanoi to reduce the insurrections." But, while comprehending U.S. purposes in the early phase of the scenario actions, they may "tend increasingly to doubt the limited character of U.S. aims" as the scale of the attacks increases. The report adds:

""Similarly, the retaliatory measures which Hanoi might take in Laos and South Vietnam night make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to regard its objectives as attainable by limited means. Thus difficulties of comprehension might increase on both sides as the scale of action mounted.""

C. Rejection of Scenario: "Use Force if Necessary"

At its meeting on 25 May, the ExCom apparently decided not to retain the scenario approach in the courses of action it would recommend to the President. At least, it abandoned the time-phasing aspects of the series of actions contained in the scenario proposal, and it made explicit its purpose not to embark on a series of moves "aimed at the use of force as an end in itself." The available evidence is far from conclusive on the reasons why the scenario approach was cast aside, but it seems clear that the potential. for entering into an escalating conflict in which our limited objectives might become obscured weighed heavily in the decision.

In addition to the evidence already cited, a strong indication of the ExCom's desire. to avoid the possibility of escalation is contained in the draft memorandum prepared for President Johnson, as a result of the 25 May meeting. In this memorandum, it was recommended that the President decide:

"...that the U.S. will use selected and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam, under the following conditions: (1) after appropriate diplomatic and political warning and preparation, (2) and unless such warning and preparation - in combination with other efforts -- should produce a sufficient improvement of non-Connunist prospects in South Vietnam and in Laos to make military action against North Vietnam unnecessary." Rh