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of leakage at the South Vietnam end. Thus, publicity seems almost inevitable to us here for any attack that did significant damage."

B. A New Scenario: 30 Days of Sequential Politico-Military Action

On the same day that the JCS urged that the GWN be consulted regarding preparations for border control and retaliatory operations, the new scenario of political and military actions was completed. The scenario called for a 30-day sequence of military and political pressures coupled with initiatives- to enter negotiations with Hanoi (see Table 1). Military actions would not start until after "favorable action on a U. S. Congressional Joint Resolution" supporting U. S. resistance to DRV aggressions in Southeast Asia. Initially, the strikes would be carried out by GN aircraft, but as they progressed, USA?/FARNGATE and other U. S. air units would join in. These "would continue despite negotiations, until there was clear evidence that North Vietnam had stopped its subversion of the South.". The negotiating objectives would be to obtain both agreement and evidence that (1) "terrorism, armed attacks, and armed resistance stop" and (2) "communications on the networks out of the North are conducted entirely in uncoded form."

Presented along with the scenario were assessments of likely communist reactions and the possible U. S. responses to these moves. The mose likely military reactions to the scenario actions were seen as expanded insurgency operations, including possible "sizeable infiltration" of North Vietnamese ground forces, and a drive toward the Mekong by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces. The Soviet Union was expected to intensify its diplomatic opposition to U. S. policies and China was expected to (1) augment North Vietnamese air defense capabilities, and (2) successfully dissuade Hanoi from any willingness (particularly after U.S. air operations began) to reduce its support of the Viet Cong. To counter communist reactions, the proposal specified in each contingency that intensified operations against North Vietnam would be the most effective option. In response to intensified insurgency, considered the least intense (though most likely) alternative available to the communist powers, the proposal included provision for augmenting South Vietnamese forces "by U. S. ground forces prepositioned in South Vietnam or on board ship nearby.

The May 23, 1964 scenario read as follows: (Table 1)

1. Stall off any 'conference on [[Laos or] Vietnam until D-Day."

2. Intermediary (Canadian?) tell North Vietnam in general terms that U.S. does not want to destroy the North Vietnam regime (and indeed is willing 'to provide a carrot'), but is determined to protect South Vietnam from North Vietnam.

3. (D-30) Presidential speech in general terms launching Joint Resolution.

4. (D-20) Obtain Joint Resolution approving past actions and authorizing whatever is necessary with respect to Vietnam. Rh