Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 2. a.djvu/53

Rh

At the Saigon meeting, the concerns of the local officials for initiating some immediate measures to relieve the situation, in South Vietnam came into conflict with the longer-range scenario approach. Ambassador Lodge "questioned the wisdom both of massive publicity and of massive destruction actions before a well-planned and well executed diplomatic attempt had been made to persuade WVN, to call off the VC." He went on to propose communicating to Hanoi, through a third-country "interlocutor." our intent to embark on a stick program," combining the threat of increasing air strikes with the granting of some assistance to the DRV. His supporting rationale explicitly cautioned that the VC. reaction to large-scale measures against the North might be violent and damaging to the South Vietnamese economy. More significant may have been the fact that the "large-scale measures" proposed in the scenario came quite late in the second stage, a stage that may not have been entered -- at least for some time.

What the Ambassador had in mind regarding a carrot and stick approach was not entirely new. It had first been proposed in his memorandum to Governor Harriman on 30 October 1963. It was raised again in cables to the White House on 20 February and 15 March 1964. Initially proposed in the context of a scheme to encourage the neutrality of North Vietnam, the carrot and stick concept envisioned a secret contact with Hanoi at which an ultimatum would be delivered demanding the DRV's cessation of support for the VC insurgency. Rewards for compliance would include our making available food imports, to help alleviate the known shortages affecting Nor Vietnan in late 1963 (and early '64). In the case of non-compliance, we would undertake previously threatened punitive strikes to which we would not admit publicly. What was new in the proposal of 19 April were: (1) the suggestion for using a third country Intermediary and (2) that one element of the "carrot" might be our pledge to withdraw some U.S. personnel from South Vietnam. The latter suggestion was criticized by Willian Bundy on the basis that we didn't yet know how many and what types of American military personnel were needed in South Vietnam. Lodge countered with the comment that "it would be very hard indeed for Ho Chi Minh to provide a salable package for his own people and for other communist nations unless we can do something that Hanoi can point to, even though it would riot be a real concession on our part."

The ensuing discussion, on a variety of points, provided an indication of some of Secretary Rusk's paramount concerns, which may shed important light on later policy decisions. For example, he sought opinions on the likely VII reaction to a Geneva Conference specifically for Laos. In another context, he stated "his concern that the extent of infiltration and other provisions of support from the North be proven to the satisfaction of our own public, of our allies, and of the neutralists." During a discussion of the availability of other Asian troops to fight in Vietnam, Secretary Rusk stated, "that we are not going to take on the sasses of Red Ching with our limited manpower in a conventional war." He also stated the opinion that the Chinese would not opt to intervene militarily Rh