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In support of this study and in order to permit necessary political evaluations. concerning the military alternatives available, the JCS were asked to furnish their views on the following issues: (1) the overall military capabilities of the DRV and Chinese Communists with respect to logistical capacity, geographical areas of operation, time required to initiate operations, and capacity for concurrent reactions in different regions; (2) military actions against NVN, using air and naval power only, which the GVN might undertake alone or which the U. S. might undertake both with and without public acknowledgment; (3) NVN targets, attack of which would be most effective in inhibiting particular DRV military capabilities; (4) course of action likely to bring about cessation of DRV support for the conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam: (5) action most likely to deter communist attacks on various parts of Asia in the event of a large-scale communist reaction to attacks on NVN; (6) the extent to which the United States could counter such reactions, using only air and naval operations and different ordnance combinations; and (7) modifications needed in current contingency plans to provide for U.S. responses depending "primarily upon air activities rather than the intervention of substantial U.S. ground forces."

The work of the study group resulted in an interim report on 1 March 1964, just prior to Secretary McNamara's and CJCS Taylor's visit to South Vietnam. This they carried with them in the form of a summary analysis of the group's findings. During a brief stopover in Honolulu, these findings and the issues raised by the Secretary's memorandum to the JCS were discussed. Particular emphasis was given to the possible advantage to be derived from converting the current operations into an "overt Vietnamese program with participation by [the] U.S. as required to obtain adequate results."

C. Study Group Analysis of Proposed Actions

The study group had given considerable attention to over U.S. actions against North Vietnam. Its analysis was based on a concept of exploiting "North Vietnamese concern that their industrialization achievements might be wiped out or could be defended (if at all) only at the price of Chicom control" and of demonstrating "that their more powerful communist allies would not risk their own interests for the sake of North Vietnam." The actions it proposed were aimed at accomplishing five objectives: (1) induce North Vietnen to curtail its support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam; (2) reduce the morale of the Viet Cong; (3) stiffen the Khanh government and discourage roves toward neutralism; (4) show the world that we will take strong measures to prevent the spread of communism; and (5) strengthen morale in Asia. However, the study group cautioned that "public justification of our actions and Its expressed rationale must be based primarily upon the fact of Northern support for and direction of the war in the South in violation of the independence of South Vietnam." It then outlined a series of public informational, domestic political, and international diplomatic steps desirable for establishing this justification.

In seeking to achieve the objective cited above, the study group suggested military actions with the best potential and raised some vital policy issues. In ascending order of the degree of national commitment, the study group believed, each would entail, the military actions vere as Rh