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 GVN. The committee noted this CIA caution but suggested it might provide a psychological advantage "for South Vietnam to acknowledge publicly its responsibility for certain of the retaliatory acts taken against the aggressor. "However, the State Department member demurred, urging that only those operations that were covert and deniable by both the GVN and the United States be undertaken. rlis caution reflected recognition "of the risks and the uncertainty as to whether operations against North Vietnam will materially contribute to our objective of ending the war."



Thus, by early February 1964, the United States had committed itself to a policy of attempting to improve the situations in South Vietnam and Laos by subjecting North Vietnam to increasing levels of direct pressure. Despite explicit assessments that the contemplated early steps could not achieve its objectives, it had embarked on a program which demanded a significant commitment for its South Vietnamese allies and which in its expected later stages could expose them to considerable risk. Moreover, by initiating a program recognized as giving little promise of achieving its stated objectives through early actions, it raised expectancies for continued and intensified operations in later stages. It can be concluded that the Administration (1) intended to continue to pursue the policy of pressuring North Vietnam until these pressures showed some propensity for success, or (2) sought through the covert operations program to achieve objectives different from those anticipated during the initial planning.