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Vietnamese insurgency. The catalogue of operations submitted from Saigon was intended to "convince the DR leadership that they should cease to support insurgent activities in the RVN and Laos." Although, In its forwarding letter, CICPAC expressed doubt that all but a few of the 2062 separate operations detailed by MACV-CAS could have that kind of effect. In his view, only air attacks and a few other "punitive or attritional" operations had any probability of success in achieving the stated objectives.

Rationale accompanying the interdepartmental committee's program recommendations, apparently accepted by higher authority, reflected. both the coercive objectives and the reservations associated with the earlier documents. Through its recommended program of "progressively escalating pressure;" the committee aimed "to inflict increasing punishment upon Horth Vietnan and to create pressures, which may convince the North Vietnamese leadership, in its own self-interest, to desist from its aggressive policies." However, it expressed the caution that "it is far from clear whether even the successful conduct of the operations. would induce Hanoi's leaders to cease and desist." still, after enumerating a number of specific risks Involved, it expressed the opinion that they were "outweighed by the potential benefits of the actions [it] recommended." In selecting these actions, the committee stated the assumption that the DRV's current strategy was to support the Viet Cong "at little cost to itself and at little risk to its industrial complex, while counting for victory upon U.S. and South Vietnamese war weariness..." It calculated:

""The importance attached by lanol's leaders to the development of North Vietnam's economy suggests that progressive damage of its industrial projects, attrition of its resources and dislocation of its economy might induce a decision to call off its physical support of the Viet Cong. This reaction might be intensified by the traditional Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination, where expanded operations by our side could arouse concern in Hanoi over the likelihood of direct Chinese Communist intervention in North Vietnamese affairs.""

Interagency commentary on the proposed operations provides additional Insight Into the rationale and expectancies associated with the initial 4-month program. After reviewing 13 of these operations, the Board of National Estimates concluded that "even if all were successful," they would not achieve the aim of convincing the DRV to alter Its policies. The Board thought it possible that North Vietnamese leaders might view these operations "as representing a significant increase in the vigor of U.S. policy, potentially dangerous to them," but with a likely reaction no more significant than a DRV effort to try to arouse greater international pressure for a Geneva-type conference on Vietnam. In addition, it cautioned that at least three operations proposed for the initial period were too large and complex to be plausibly denied by the Rh