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fail to produce desired results. In the case of the covert operations program, these tendencies were reinforced through the evocation of a GN policy commitment and the involvement of CVI officials in its implementation.

B. Origins and Development: Presidential Support and Approval

The covert program was spared in May of 1963, when the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare a plan for GVN "hit and run" operations against NVN. These operations were to be "non-attributable" and carried out "with U.S. military materiel, training and advisory assistance." Approved by. the JCS on 9 September as CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, the plan was discussed during the Vietnam policy conference at Honolulu, 20 November 1963. Here a decision was made to develop c. combined COMUSMACV-CAS, Saigon plan for a 12-ronth program of covert operations. Instructions forwarded by the JCS on 26 November specifically requested provision for: "(1) harassment; (2) diversion; (3) political pressure; (4) capture of prisoners; (5) physical destruction; (6) acquisition of intelligence; (7) generation of intelligence; and (8) diversion of DRV resources." Further, that the plan provide for "selected actions of graduated scope and intensity to include commando type coastal raids. To this guidance was added that given by President Johnson to the effect that "planning should include... estimates of such factors as: (1) resulting damage to NVN; (2) the plausibility of dental; (3) possible wit retaliation; and (4) other international reaction."  The MACV-CAS plan, designated OPLAN 34A, and providing for "a spectrum of capabilities for RVIAF to execute against NVN," was forwarded by CINCPAC on 19 December 1963.

The idea of putting direct pressure on North Vietnam met prompt receptivity on the part of President Johnson. According to then Assistant Secretary of State, Roger Iilsran, it was just a few days before the military-CIA submission that State Department, Counselor, Walt Rostov passed to the President "a well-reasoned case for a gradual escalation." Rostow was well-known as an advocate of taking direct measures against the external sources of guerrilla support, having hammered away at this, theme since he first presented it at Fort Bragg in April 1961. In any event, on 21 December, President Johnson directed that an interdepartmental committee study the NACV-CAS plan to select from it those least, risk." This committee, under the chairmanship of Major General Krulak, USNC, completed its study on 2 January 1964 and submitted its report for review by the principal officials of its various member agencies. The report recommended the 3-phase approach and the variety of Phase I operations described earlier. President Jonson approved the committee's recommendations on 16 January and directed that the initial 4-month phase of the program be implemented beginning 1 February.

C. Concept and Rationale: Convince DRV to Desist by Raising the Cost

In view of program performance and later decisions, the conceptualization underlying the program of covert operations against North Wetnan is particularly significant. JCS objectives for the initial CINCPIC formulation were to increase the cost, to the DRV of its role in the South Rh