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I. Initiation of Covert Operations

On 1 February 1964, the United States embarked on a new course of action in pursuance of its long-standing policy of attempting to. bolster the security of Southeast Asia. On that date, under direction of the American military establishment, an elaborate program of covert military operations against the state of North Vietnam was set in motion. There were precedents: a variety of covert activities had been sponsored by. the American CIA since 1961. Intelligence agents, resupplied by air, had been dispatched into North Vietnam; resistance and sabotage teams had been recruited inside the country; and propaganda leaflets had been dispensed from "civilian mercenary" aircraft. But the program that began in February 1964 was different, and its impact on future U.S. policy in Southeast Asia was far-reaching.

A. Covert Action Program: Scope and Character

The covert action program beginning in February 1964 was different, first of all, because it was a program. Designed to extend over a period of 12 months, it was divided into three phases distinguished by the character and intensity of their respective operations. The first phase (February through May) called for intelligence collection through U-2 and communications intelligence missions and psychological operations involving leaflet drops, propaganda kit deliveries, and radio broadcasts. It also provided for about "20 destructive undertakings, all within... early prospective [GVN] capabilities...[and] designed to result in substantial destruction, economic loss and harassment." The second and third phases involved the same categories of action, but of increased tempo and magnitude, and with the destructive operations extending to "targets identified with North Vietnam's economic and industrial well-being." Once started, the program was intended to inflict on North Vietnam, increasing levels of punishment for its aggressive policies.

The 1964 program was different also because: it was placed under control of an operational U.S. military command. Though the program was designed to be carried out by GIf or third country personnel, plans were developed by COMUSACV and the GVN jointly and given interagency clearance in Washington through a special office under the JCS. CINCPAC and the appropriate CIA station furnished the necessary training and equip-rent support and CONJERACY exercised operational control. Since subsequent phases of the covert program were to be based on a continuous evaluation of actions already taken, operation reports were submitted periodically through JCS staff channels for review by various Washington agencies.

Normally such routine staffing arrangements tend to encourage expectations of continued program actions. Moreover, they foreshadow bureaucratic pressures for taking stronger measures should previous ones Rh