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 to "be developed with great care. There would still be another meeting with the President on the matter, on 6 May, before McNamara departed for the trip that would take him to Saigon (after Bonn). McNamara would take up issues with Lodge upon his arrival there. But before the 6 May meeting with the President, would Lodge please answer seven questions as a contribution to the Washington consideration of the issue.

The questions raised by the Secretary and the answers provided later by the Embassy follow:

1. What were Khanh's motivations? Does he believe that mobilization makes sense as a preparation for military action against North Vietnam? : Khanh as professional soldier thinks in terms of victory. Not a matter of pique. Honestly seeking a means of putting country on war footing.

2. Is there a trace of despair in Khanh's remarks? Does he think he can win without attacking north? : No.

3. Previously Khanh told McNamara it would be necessary to consolidate a base in South Vietnam for attacking North Vietnam. Previous counterguerrilla experience in Greece, Malaya, and Korea supports this judgment. : Khanh does want to move regardless of progress in the South.

4. Khanh' s talk of evacuating seems fantastic. : Agree. Khanh's concern was an ability to administer the city if attacked. (This referred to Khanh's discussion of evacuating the city.)

5. Were Khanh's talks of warning to Hanoi and Cambodia and action against the French integral parts of mobilization? : Yes. But he should have against French nationals.

6. How to interpret Khanh's remarks about U.S. "Army Corps?" : Loose talk. This reaction came after (Lodge's) discouraging reply about the possibility of the U.S. bringing in large numbers of forces.

7. Was the GVN capable of administering limited mobilization? : Question is a puzzler. However, some such thing might be a way of overcoming "business as usual." 84/

The response to Khanh's proposal that came out of the 6 May meeting was that the Secretary of Defense was to tell Khanh, when he was in Saigon, that the U.S. did "not intend to provide military support nor undertake the military objective of rolling back Communist control in North Vietnam." 85/ Rh