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 land reform program was half completed some years ago); the VC had been exploiting the situation very effectively;

- oppressive marketing conditions for fisherman (fisheries accounted for 25 per cent of the rural product of SVN).

General Khanh's initial statement about the land reform problem was not very encouraging; Mr. Oanh was not even aware of the rice problem until a conversation with U.S. visitors on March 10th.

A major requirement for success of the Pacification Plan was to improve greatly the leadership, pay, training, and numbers of some of the kinds of personnel needed, notably:

- pay and allowances for Civil Guards and S.D.C…

- recruitment and training for more civilian technicians…also increased pay and supporting costs for them; and recruitment and training of a new kind of rural worker--"hamlet action teams"--to move into newly cleared hamlets and start improvement programs…

The real problems were managerial: to develop concepts, training schools, action programs, and above all, leadership at the provincial level and below.

Other requirements for success of the Pacification Plan included: improvement in the leadership and attitudes of the ARVN particularly at levels which came into contact with villagers; greatly increased military civic action programs by the ARVN; much more flexibility and decentralization of authority in the administration of GVN civilian agencies; and a far clearer and more consistent pattern of rewarding excellence and penalizing poor performance in the management of both military and civilian agencies of the GVN.

Finally, there was one prominent recommendation (it was in fact the second of twelve): that the U.S. "make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups." This reflected our deep concern over the political instability and our dismay at having been surprised by the Khanh coup at the end of January.

An immediate measure to provide this kind of support to Khanh was the issuance on the following day (17 March) of a White House release which gave Presidential public blessing to the Khanh regime, saying in part that, to meet the difficulties and setbacks that had arisen since last October, "General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively…[having] produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater Rh