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 Included in the MCV assessment was the opinion that military effort could not succeed in the absence of effective political leadership. A special CIA report, forwarded to Secretary McNamara at about the same time made the opposite point: military victories were needed to nourish the popular attitudes conducive to political stability. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman -- who would shortly leave office after his views were rejected -- stressed the need for physical security in the rural areas and the adoption of counterguerrilla tactics as the preconditions to success. These interesting reversals of nominal functional preferences indicate that there was at least a sufficiently broad awareness within U.S. Officialdom to permit a useful debate on U.S. actions which might deal more successfully with this seamless web of political-military issues. Certainly the intelligence picture was dark enough to permit such a debate: the SNIE on short-term prospects in Southeast Asia warned that "…South Vietnam has, at best, an even chance of withstanding the insurgency menace during the next few weeks or months."

The debate did begin, but in hobbles. The generally agreed necessity to work through GW and the felt imperative to strengthen GVN left the U.S. in a position of weakness. It was at least as dependent on GVN leaders as were the latter on U.S. support. Moreover, mid-1964 was not an auspicious time for new departures in policy by a President who wished to portray "moderate" alternatives to his opponent's "radical" proposals. Nor was any time prior to or immediately following the elections very appealing for the same reason. Thus, while the debate in high official circles was very, very different from the public debate it still reflected the existence of the public debate.

The first official internal pronouncement to reflect this difficult policymaking milieu was NSAM 288, in March 1964. Approved verbatim from the report of the most recent McNamara-Taylor visit to Vietnam, it was virtually silent on one issue (U.S. troops) and minimal in the scale of its recommendations at the same time that it stated U.S. objectives in the most sweeping terms used up to that time. The U.S. objective was stated to be an "independent, non-communist South Vietnam, free to accept assistance as required to maintain its security" even though not necessarily a member of the Western alliance. The importance of this objective was underscored in a classic statement of the domino theory:

"Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased."

Rh