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 Except for 2f, 2g, 2i, 2j, and the escalatory military actions of paragraph 3 that had been suggested previous]y by the JCS, this memorandum outlined much of the program that was to be adopted by the SecDef in March after his trip to Saigon, and approved by the President thereafter as NSAM 288.

8.

Before the Secretary left for Vietnam, trip books were prepared for his use and the use of others in his official party. In this trip was an appraisal of the Vietnam situation, dated 3 March 1964, prepared especially for this occasion by the normally optimistic SACSA. It began with this summary:

"The RVN faces the most critical situation in its nearly 10 years of existence. This situation is the result of political erosion, culminating in two changes of government within three months and in a nationwide revamping of civil administrators, and of the continued growth of a well-organized, dedicated Communist insurgency movement. 52/"

This was followed hy a political discussion wherein there was mention of the chronic shortage of competent administrators. The government was credited with superior material resources, but, "unless it is able to demonstrate the willpower and political skill to bring this potential to bear, the political and security situation will continue to deteriorate." It was considered hopeful that Khanh seemed determined to provide dynamic leadership, but it was observed that he would have to overcome "widespread public and official apathy, lack of confidence, low morale, and factionalism among key personnel."

Khanh's efforts and attributes were catalogued approvingly, but this only lead to a concluding paragraph as follows:

"Encouraging as Khanh's performance has been to date, he has not been able to counteract the overall trend of events in South Vietnam. In many of the most critical provinces, pacification programs remain at a virtual standstill and there is an evident lack of urgency and clear direction. 53/"

This was followed by a section entitled "Military and Security Situation." This section contained an interesting judgment, which represented a reversal by SACSA of opinions expressed six months or more before concerning the time when the situation had begun to deteriorate. Rh